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Abstract. We have developed a system that automatically detects online jihadist hate 
speech with over 80% accuracy, by using techniques from Natural Language 
Processing and Machine Learning. The system is trained on a corpus of 45,000 
subversive Twitter messages collected from October 2014 to December 2016. We 
present a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the jihadist rhetoric in the corpus, 
examine the network of Twitter users, outline the technical procedure used to train 
the system, and discuss examples of use.  
Keywords: jihadism, hate speech, text analytics, text profiling, machine learning 
1 Introduction 
Online hate speech is believed to play an important role in the advocacy of terrorism.1 This is 
certainly true in the case of the Islamic State (ةیيملاسلإاا ةلوودلاا,  ISIS / ISIL / IS / Daesh ), which 
has used an effective online propaganda machine to spread fundamentalist views on Islam, to 
recruit members and to incite fear and violence.2 Examples include their digital magazine 
Dabiq and videos issued by the al-Hayāt Media Center,3 but also the network of self-
radicalized (or radicalizing) followers on social networks such as Twitter. On February 5, 
2016, Twitter issued a press release to speak out against the use of their platform for the 
promotion of terrorism.4 They reported suspending over 125,000 user profiles that endorsed 
acts of terrorism, remarking that “there is no ‘magic algorithm’ for identifying terrorist 
content on the internet, so global online platforms are forced to make challenging judgment 
calls based on very limited information and guidance.” 
                                                
1 Robert S. Tanenbaum, “Preaching Terror: Free Speech or Wartime Incitement,” American University Law Review 55 (2005): 785. 
2 Luis Tomé, “The ‘Islamic State’: Trajectory and reach a year after its self proclamation as a ‘Caliphate’” (University of Lisbon, 2015). 
3 “Al-Hayat Media Center promotes barbaric execution video as leading top 10 list,” SITE Intelligence Group, July 3, 2015, 
https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/al-hayat-media-center-promotes-barbaric-execution-video-as-leading-top-10-list.html 
4 “Combating Violent Extremism,” Twitter, February 5, 2016,  
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2016/combating-violent-extremism.html 
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We have developed a system that can automatically detect jihadist hate speech with over 80% 
accuracy, using techniques from Natural Language Processing5 and Machine Learning.6 Such 
systems can help companies like Twitter to identify subversive content. 
HATE SPEECH 
Hate speech can be defined as “any communication that disparages a person or a group on 
the basis of some characteristic such as race, color, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, 
nationality, religion, or other characteristic”.7 Hate speech is prohibited by law in several 
European countries such as Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) does not offer a legal definition of hate speech. Article 20 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that “any advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law”.8 In the United States, hate speech is protected by the First Amendment 
and it has been argued that Article 20 of the ICCPR is unconstitutional according to the 
Supreme Court.9 Nonetheless, as of May 23, 2016, several technology companies that play an 
unintended but significant role in the proliferation of hate speech, including Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft and Twitter, have jointly agreed to a European Union Code of Conduct to 
remove illegal online hate speech within 24 hours.10  
JIHADIST HATE SPEECH 
Jihadist hate speech can be defined as hate speech proliferated by members or fans of Salafi 
jihadist militant groups, such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS, that is intended as propaganda, to incite 
violence or to threaten civilians, and which is either illegal (e.g., execution videos) or at least 
worrisome (e.g., promoting radicalization by framing nonbelievers as “worthless dogs”).11 
                                                
5 Daniel Jurafsky and James H. Martin, Speech and Language Processing (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2008). 
6 Fabrizio Sebastiani, “Machine Learning in Automated Text Categorization,” ACM Computing Surveys 34, no. 1 (2002): 1-47. 
7 John T. Nockleby, “Hate speech,” in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 2000): 1277-1279. 
8 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx 
9 Michael Herz and Péter Molnár, eds., The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
10 Alex Hern, “Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Microsoft sign EU hate speech code,” The Guardian, May 31, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/31/facebook-youtube-twitter-microsoft-eu-hate-speech-code 
11 Jytte Klausen et al., “The YouTube Jihadists: A Social Network Analysis of Al-Muhajiroun’s Propaganda Campaign,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2012). 
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ONLINE JIHADIST HATE SPEECH 
Online jihadist hate speech can be found on social networks such as Twitter and Facebook, on 
video-sharing websites such as YouTube, on text-sharing websites such as JustPaste.it, and on 
encrypted chat apps such as Telegram, to name a few.12 The content may include news 
updates, war photography, interviews with celebrity jihadists, fundamentalist interpretations 
of Islam, testimonial videos, execution videos, chants (anasheed), handbooks, infographics, 
advertisements, games and personal opinions, often expressed repetitively. In our experience, 
it is not hard to find if one knows what to look for. 
2 Data collection 
We have collected a corpus of online jihadist hate speech that consists of 49,311 “tweets” 
(public messages of no more than a 140 characters) posted by 367 Twitter users, henceforth 
the HATE corpus. As a counterweight, we have also collected a corpus of 35,166 tweets by 66 
users that talk about Islam, Iraq, Syria, Western culture, and so on, without spreading hate 
speech, henceforth the SAFE corpus. Both corpora were extensively double-checked. 
The SAFE corpus consists of tweets posted by reporters, imams and Muslims, for example  
@HalaJaber (a Lebanese-British journalist), @TRACterrorism (Terrorist Research & Analysis 
Consortium), @BBCArabic, @TheNobleQuran and @AppleSUX (an ISIS parody account). To 
balance the size of both corpora we added 15,000 random tweets from as many Twitter users 
to the SAFE corpus, on any topic from cooking to sports, in any language. 
The HATE corpus was gradually expanded from October 2014 to December 2016. With each 
update we manually identified new subversive profiles and automatically collected tweets 
from all of them using the Pattern toolkit13 and the Twitter API. Content was mainly collected 
in the aftermath of 10 incidents during this time period:14 
1. Charlie Hebdo shootings (January 7, 2015). Saïd (34) and Chérif Kouachi (32) force 
their way into the offices of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, armed with 
automatic rifles, killing 20 and injuring 22. We collected approximately 15,000 tweets. 
                                                
12 Ali Fisher. “How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Online Presence,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 3 (2015). 
13 Tom De Smedt and Walter Daelemans, “Pattern for Python,” Journal of Machine Learning Research 13 (2012): 2063-2067. 
14 “List of Islamist terrorist attacks,” Wikipedia, November 24, 2017,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Islamist_terrorist_attacks 
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2. Sinai attacks (January 29, 2015). Over 25 ISIS-affiliated militants target police offices, 
an army base and security checkpoints in Egypt, armed with mortars and car bombs, 
killing 44 and injuring 62. We collected approximately 10,000 tweets. 
3. Atatürk Airport attack (June 20, 2015). Three or four ISIS-affiliated militants stage an 
attack at Turkey’s international airport, armed with automatic rifles and explosive belts, 
killing 30 and injuring 104. We collected approximately 1,000 tweets. 
4. Paris attacks (November 13, 2015). Three ISIS suicide bombers strike at Stade de 
France during a football match, followed by shootings at restaurants by another three 
and finally a shooting at the Bataclan theatre by three more, in total killing 137 and 
injuring 368. We collected approximately 7,500 tweets. 
5. Brussels bombings (March 22, 2016). Five ISIS suicide bombers linked to the Paris 
attackers strike at Belgium’s national airport and a Brussels metro station, killing 35 and 
injuring over 300. We collected approximately 5,000 tweets. 
6. Lahore bombing (March 27, 2016). A suicide bomber targets Pakistan’s largest park, 
killing 70 and injuring 300, most of them Muslim women and children. We collected 
approximately 3,000 tweets.  
7. Orlando nightclub shooting (June 12, 2016). Lone wolf attacker Omar Mateen (29) 
enters a Florida LGBT nightclub, armed with a semi-automatic rifle, killing 49 and 
injuring 53, pledging allegiance to ISIS. We collected approximately 1,000 tweets. 
8. Nice attack (July 14, 2016). Lone wolf ISIS supporter Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel (31) 
drives a truck into crowds of people celebrating France’s Bastille Day on the Promenade 
des Anglais, killing 87 and injuring 434. We collected approximately 1,000 tweets. 
9. Botroseya Church bombing (December 11, 2016). ISIS militant Mahmoud Shafiq 
Mohammed Mustafa (22) enters a renowned Coptic church in Egypt, armed with an 
explosive vest, killing 29 and injuring 47. We collected approximately 500 tweets. 
10. Berlin attack (December 19, 2016). ISIS militant Anis Amri (24) hijacks a truck and 
drives it into a crowd at a German Christmas market, killing 12 and wounding 56. We 
collected approximately 1,500 tweets. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of tweets automatically collected from manually identified Twitter profiles. 
All of the known perpetrators appear to be men and, where age is known, most of them 
young adults aged 20-35. Over time we observed how attacks became more improvised, with 
smaller teams of perpetrators often using more improvised weapons such as trucks. We also 
collected increasingly smaller amounts of tweets (see Figure 1). One explanation for the 
latter is that Twitter increasingly became more proactive in suspending subversive profiles 
and removing hate speech.15 In 2017, jihadist hate speech became much harder to find on 
Twitter, as participants moved to encrypted, anonymous messaging apps such as Telegram.16 
However, this does not mean that the problem has been solved, or that it may not resurface 
on public forums. While the move to Telegram can be seen as a tactical retreat, it may also 
have lacked the broad appeal of a public forum such as Twitter.17 Today, new subversive 
Twitter profiles continue to appear and disappear in a relentless game of cat-and-mouse, as 
organizations such as ISIS continue to strive to spread their views.18 Consequently, a report 
                                                
15 Adam Satariano, “Twitter Suspends 300,000 Accounts Tied to Terrorism in 2017,” Bloomberg, September 19, 2017, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-19/twitter-suspends-300-000-accounts-in-2017-for-terrorism-content 
16 J. M. Berger and Heather Perez, “The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How suspensions are limiting the social 
networks of English-speaking ISIS supporters” (George Washington University, 2016). 
17 Gabriel Weimann, “Terrorist Migration to the Dark Web,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 3 (2016). 
18 “IS taaier online dan in het veld,” De Morgen, September 22, 2017,  
https://www.demorgen.be/plus/is-taaier-online-dan-in-het-veld-b-1506037201339/ 
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issued by the European Commission on September 28, 2017 has outlined new guidelines on 
illegal hate speech and terrorism-related content, urging Facebook, Google, Microsoft and 
Twitter to improve their detection capabilities.19 
2.1 Manual identification 
For data collection, we first identified 367 subversive profiles, by regularly searching Twitter 
for keywords such as kuffar (ررّافك, unbelievers) and examining profiles that use these words in 
their tweets. The combination of a profile’s username, profile picture, names of places and 
rhetoric can be used to reliably identify subversive profiles. Once a few profiles have been 
found, it is not hard to find more by examining their network of friends, including profiles 
practicing countermeasures against identification (e.g., choosing @1Ak187 as a username). 
By username. One useful cue to identify a target profile is its username. Each Twitter 
account has a unique alphanumeric username that appears with every message and that can 
be used to mention or cite (retweet) another user by prepending the @ symbol. For example:  
RT @pioiuhghsd42424: #Bruxelles Après les bombes, attendez nos soldats en 
kalachnikovs. Ils vont mitrailler dans toutes les rues !يي 
Posted by @nightwalker_118 (March 22, 2016) 
Twitter users tend to choose a username that reflects their actual name, gender, personality 
or occupation.20 ISIS and similar groups have standardized conventions for noms de guerre 
(ةیينك, kunya), which start with Abu and end with the tribe or place of origin, as in Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi or Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, where Muhajir denotes a Muslim immigrant, more 
specifically a foreign Jihad fighter.21 In combination with other cues it is useful to scan the 
username of a profile for abu, mujahid, muhajir, and so on, as illustrated in Figure 2. In this 
example, the username (@AbuluqmanIS) in combination with the actual name (Abu Luqman 
al-Muhajir) and the profile picture is a strong cue. Reading the user’s tweets then confirms it. 
                                                
19 “Communication on Tackling Illegal Content Online - Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms,” European Commission, 
September 28, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-tackling-illegal-content-online-towards-
enhanced-responsibility-online-platforms 
20 Jing Liu et al., “What's in a Name? An Unsupervised Approach to Link Users Across Communities,” in Proceedings of the Sixth ACM 
International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, 495-504, 2013. 
21 Vera Mironova and Karam Alhamad, “The Names of Jihad: A Guide to ISIS' Noms de Guerre,” Foreign Affairs, July 14, 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-07-14/names-jihad 
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Figure 2. Profile identification by username. 
In our dataset of 367 Twitter profiles, we have 40 usernames that start with Abu (father, e.g., 
@AbuHamzaIS), we have 6 that start with Umm (mother, e.g., @_UmmWaqqas), 5 that contain 
Muhajir (@Muhajir_Miski1) and 4 others that contain Jihad (@JihadiA6). Unfortunately, 
nowadays usernames of subversive profiles are mostly random, e.g., @pioiuhghsd42424 or 
@c0n0fj1had4_, no doubt in an attempt to hide the user’s identity. Monitoring users as they 
move from one anonymous account to the next anonymous account is challenging because 
we only have their writing style and retweets as a given. 
 
Figure 3. Profile identification by picture.  
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By picture. Another useful cue is the profile picture, often showing a masked person holding 
a firearm, or a landmark such as the Eiffel Tower in flames, or the ISIS flag. Interestingly, 
some profile pictures display a lion, cat or kitten, which presumably serves as a metaphor for 
bravery and martyrdom. Figure 3 shows the profile of a masked person with a scoped rifle. In 
combination with the profile’s username (@AbuAhmedHolland) and a tweet that mentions 
#ramadi (i.e., a city in Iraq on the route to Syria) it is a strong cue. 
By location. Another useful cue is the user’s location. Some Twitter profiles broadcast their 
geolocation coordinates in their metadata22 while other profiles may mention names of places 
in war zones and/or post photos of the local area. 
By rhetoric. Jihadist hate speech is grounded in a selective and fundamentalist (Salafist) 
view on the Quran23 that can be difficult to spot by outsiders, particularly because of spelling 
variations used by different foreign fighters. But some recurring words for which even Google 
Translate and Wikipedia offer definitions stand out. For example, takfīr (ریيفكت ) refers to the 
excommunication of infidel Muslims, perhaps because of nifaq (ققافن ), hypocrisy and 
insincerity with grave consequences in the afterlife, or shirk (ككرش ), the sin of worshipping 
gods besides Allah . Using such words in Twitter Search yields interesting hits (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Profile identification by language use. 
                                                
22 Elizabeth Bodine-Baron et al, “Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter” (RAND, 2016). 
23 Donald Holbrook, “Using the Qur’an to Justify Terrorist Violence: Analysing Selective Application of the Qur’an in English-Language 
Militant Islamist Discourse,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 3 (2010). 
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2.2 Automatic collection 
We used the Pattern toolkit for the Python programming language to automatically collect 
tweets posted by our set of manually identified profiles. A sample is shown in Figure 5. An 
example Python script is shown below. It will store the most recent tweets posted by @BBC in a 
CSV file (comma-separated values) while discarding duplicates that it has already seen. 
 
Figure 5. Automatic collection of tweets into a CSV file (displayed in Google Sheets). 
# coding: utf-8 
 
# http://github.com/clips/pattern 
 
from pattern.db  import Datasheet 
from pattern.web import Twitter 
 
try: 
    data = Datasheet.load('tweets.csv') 
    seen = data.columns[0] 
except: 
    data = Datasheet() 
    seen = [] 
 
twitter = Twitter() 
 
for username in ('@BBC',): 
    for tweet in twitter.search('from:' + username, count=100): 
        if tweet.id not in seen: 
            data.append(( 
                tweet.id, 
                tweet.author, 
                tweet.text, 
                tweet.date 
            )) 
 
data.save('tweets.csv') 
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3 Data evaluation (HATE) 
3.1 Qualitative analysis 
The HATE corpus primarily consists of tweets posted in direct response to terrorist attacks. We 
did not study how tweets prior to an attack might have fueled the event. Following is a 
selection of tweets in the corpus and a short discussion of their characteristics. In general, 
jihadist rhetoric on social media appears to be riddled with spelling errors, slang, sarcasm, 
juvenile boasting, bonding (e.g., خخاا, akh, brother) and emoticons – in particular the raised 
index finger ( ) and tears of joy ( ). 
Europe will spend the rest if its miserable days on tender hooks  
Posted by @bintislamiya19 (March 22, 2016) 
 
Les mecs executent les otages trkl oklm, malgre le fait que l'armee (aussi 
incompetente soit-elle) les traque  #fusillade 
Posted by @Aljabarti45 (November 13, 2015) 
 
Allahu Akbaaaar Allahu Akbaaaaar Daulatul Islamiya baqiya watatamadad  
DIE IN YOUR RAGE #KUFFARES 
Posted by @AlTaifatul11 (November 14, 2015) 
 
Did the kuffar think tht they will be left alone after harming us?  
Have a taste of ur own medicine #brusselsairport 
Posted by @Jundullah40 (March 22, 2016) 
In the first example, the raised index finger refers to Tawhid (دیيحوت ), the fundamental concept 
in Islam that God is one and absolute. More specifically, Salafi jihadist organizations such as 
ISIS adhere to a fundamentalist interpretation of Tawhid that rejects non-fundamentalist 
regimes as idolatrous, demanding destruction.24 
In the second example, the author is mocking the police during the Bataclan raid, where the 
perpetrators (les mecs, the guys) executed their hostages. Urbandictionary.com defines trkl as 
a French phonetic deformation of tranquille (be calm) and oklm as au calme (be cool).  
                                                
24 Nathaniel Zelinsky, “ISIS Sends a Message: What Gestures Say About Today’s Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, September 3, 2014, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-09-03/isis-sends-message 
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In the third and fourth examples, threats are made against the “unbelievers” (kuffar, kufr, 
dogs, pigs), a prevalent theme in jihadist rhetoric.25 Tweets may be interspersed with Arabic 
words or phonetic transliterations, such as dawla or daulat for al-Dawla (ةلوودلاا, the state). In 
the third example, Daulatul Islamiya baqiya watatamadad refers to ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah 
(the Islamic State) and its slogan “Baqiya wa Tatamadad”, Lasting and Expanding.26 The 
colorful writing style in jihadist rhetoric is advantageous, because it is more predictable. 
The HATE corpus includes some well-known ISIS supporters, at least in hindsight. Below is an 
overview of those that we were able to identify using publicly available resources: 
● Abu al-Baraa el-Azdi (@AbuAlbaraaSham). Saudi preacher that became the religious 
judge of the city of Derna in Libya, which he declared to be a franchise of the Islamic 
State in October 2014.27 
● Anjem Choudary (@anjemchoudary). British spokesman of Islam4UK, an activist group in 
the United Kingdom, who was sentenced to five years and six months in prison on 
September 6, 2016 on terrorism charges. 
● Junaid Hussain (@abuhussain1337_). British hacker of the Cyber Caliphate and high-
profile propagandist of lone wolf terrorism, who was killed in Syria on August 24, 2015 
by a targeted drone strike.28 
● Rawdah Abdisalaam (@_UmmWaqqas). Female student of journalism based in Seattle29 
(possibly of Finnish or Dutch origin) who became a major online ISIS recruiter, and is 
believed to have traveled to Syria. 
Other known profiles include Sally Jones (@UmmHussain107), the wife of Junaid Hussain, Anis 
Abou Bram (@abubrams), a radicalized Belgian teen killed in Syria in February 2015, and Abu 
Abdullah Britani (@abu_britani2), who was ridiculed online for threatening to take over 
Rome and throw homosexuals off “your leaning tower of pizza” (sic). 
                                                
25 Anina L. Kinzel, “From Keywords to Discursive Legitimation: Representing ‘kuffar’ in the Jihadist Propaganda Magazines,” in 
Proceedings of Corpus Linguistics Fest 2016, 26-33, 2016. 
26 Omar Ashour, “Enigma of ‘Baqiya wa Tatamadad’: The Islamic State Organization's Military Survival” (Al Jazeera, 2016). 
27 Paul Cruickshank et al., “ISIS comes to Libya,” CNN, November 18, 2014. 
28 Stefano Mele, “Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic ‘Cyber Terrorist’,” in Countering Terrorism, Preventing 
Radicalization and Protecting Cultural Heritage: The Role of Human Factors and Technology (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2017): 103. 
29 “Rawdah Abdisalaam a.k.a. @_UmmWaqqas,” Counter Extremism Project,  
https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/rawdah-abdisalaam-aka-ummwaqqas 
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3.2 Quantitative analysis 
TEXT ANALYTICS 
Over the past decade, tools for Natural Language Processing (NLP) have become faster and 
more reliable, to the extent that they can now be applied to analyze large quantities of text in 
real-time (i.e., Big Data). For example, part-of-speech tagging can be used to detect word 
types (e.g., noun, verb) based on a word’s position in the sentence, topic detection can be 
used to categorize articles (politics, sports, etc.), and sentiment analysis can be used to detect 
the tone of voice (e.g., positive, negative) in product reviews.30 This is called text analytics.  
TEXT PROFILING 
More recent systems can also be used to detect the age, gender, education or personality of 
authors.31 This is called text profiling. Text profiling relies on the writing style of different 
individuals.32 For example, statistically, women tend to use more personal pronouns (I, you, 
we) to talk about people and relationships, while men use more determiners (a, the) and 
quantifiers (one, many) to talk about objects and concepts. Adolescents use more informal 
language such as abbreviated utterances (omg, wow) and adjectives (awesome, lame) to talk 
about school, parents and partying, while adults use more complex sentence structures and 
less emoticons to talk about work, children and health, and so on.  
We used the Textgain API33 to automatically detect the language and tone of voice of each 
tweet in the HATE corpus, the main keywords and names of places, and the age, gender and 
education level of the authors. The Textgain API operates by analyzing a text that is sent to 
the secure server and by responding with, for example, M or F for gender, or 25+ or 25- for 
age. The aggregated results are discussed below and represented in Figure 7. 
                                                
30 Tom De Smedt and Walter Daelemans. “‘Vreselijk mooi!’ (terribly beautiful): A Subjectivity Lexicon for Dutch Adjectives,” In 
Proceedings of the 8th Language Resources and Evaluation Conference, 3568-3572, 2012. 
31 Ben Verhoeven, Walter Daelemans, and Tom De Smedt, “Ensemble Methods for Personality Recognition,” in Proceedings of the 
Workshop on Computational Personality Recognition, 35-38, 2013. 
32 James W. Pennebaker, The Secret Life of Pronouns: What Our Words Say About Us (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011). 
33 “Textgain: Web services for predictive text analytics,” Textgain,  
https://www.textgain.com 
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Language. The Textgain API has an accuracy of 
95% for language detection, meaning an error rate 
of 1/20. The HATE corpus mainly consists of tweets 
written in English (about 40%) and Arabic (30%). 
About 20% of tweets are written in French, Italian, 
Portuguese, Swedish, Dutch, Farsi, Turkish and 
German. All other languages make up about 10% 
of the corpus, mainly Finnish, Indonesian, Latvian, 
Danish and Spanish. 
Region. We scanned each tweet for mentions of a 
country’s name or capital city. Syria is mentioned 
in 1,191 tweets (about 2.5%), Iraq in 932 (about 
2%) and France in 667 (1.5%). Other countries 
mentioned include the United States, Israel, Russia, 
Jordan, Iran, Egypt and Yemen. Paris is mentioned 
in 921 tweets, Baghdad in 217 and Brussels in 179. 
Other capital cities mentioned include Doha, 
Damascus, London and Jerusalem. 
Age & gender. We used the API to detect the age 
and gender of each author. We only used English 
tweets (i.e., 40% of the corpus) for which the API 
has an accuracy of 75%. We grouped tweets by 
author, since more text gives more reliable results. 
About 95% of authors are predicted to be adults 
(25+) and 5% adolescents (25-). About 95% are 
predicted to be men (M) and 5% women (F). 
Tone. We used the API to detect the tone of voice  
(positive, negative or neutral) in each tweet, for 
which the API has an accuracy of 75%. About 35% 
of the tweets are predicted as positive, 45% as 
negative and 20% as neutral. By comparison, the 
SAFE corpus has 50% neutral tweets and only 15% 
negative tweets. This is because it consists of news 
 LANGUAGE TWEETS % 
EN English 19063 38.7% 
AR Arabic 13675 27.7% 
FR French 2304 4.7% 
IT Italian 1762 3.6% 
PT Portuguese 1747 3.5% 
SV Swedish 1691 3.4% 
NL Dutch 1684 3.4% 
FA Farsi 1101 2.2% 
TR Turkish 986 2.0% 
DE German 897 1.8% 
 ... 4401 8.9% 
 
 REGION 
 
 
 CTRS-007  16/31 
updates and tweets by ordinary people that do not 
talk about stupid kuffar, evil cretins, filthy dogs, 
vile French crusaders, and so on. 
Education. About 60% of authors are predicted as 
educated (fluent writing) and 40% as less educated 
(poor writing / foreign speaker). Accuracy: 80%. 
 
Figure 7. The HATE corpus in charts. 
3.3 Keyword analysis 
What is the probability that a given word occurs in a hateful tweet? While function words 
such as the and we will occur in any kind of tweet, the rationale is that content words such as 
football or jihad will occur more often in specific kinds of tweets (i.e., sports tweets vs. hate 
speech). Conversely, their occurrence can serve as a good cue for determining what kind of 
tweet we are dealing with. To assess which words are significantly biased, we used a chi-
squared test34 with p ≤ 0.01. As it turns out, thousands of words are significantly biased. The 
chi-squared test does not tell us to what kind of tweet (HATE / SAFE) but we can also calculate 
the posterior probability P(θ|x) that a word occurs in a hateful tweet. This exposes keywords 
such as crusader, curse, khilafah, kuffar, martyrdom, rage, shirk, and so on. Independently, 
these words do not necessarily need to raise a red flag, but rather a combination of them 
does, as in: “Die in your rage kuffar!” (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Word tree showing the context for “rage” in the HATE corpus. 
                                                
34 Huan Liu, and Hiroshi Motoda, eds., Computational Methods of Feature Selection (Chapman and Hall/CRC Press, 2007). 
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Figure 9 below provides a random sample of biased words, each with a short description, the 
probability that a tweet constitutes hate speech if the word appears in it (%) and the total 
number of times (#) that the word appears in the HATE + SAFE corpora: 
KEYWORD DESCRIPTION HATE % # 
jihad literally: struggling; ideologically: war against unbelievers 79% 978 
kafir, kuffar, kufr unbeliever(s) 98% 1349 
shirk idolatry = worshipping other gods but Allah  96% 111 
mujahid jihad fighter 96% 776 
muhajir jihad fighter from a foreign country 80% 359 
lion jihad fighter with bravery 81% 423 
murtad a Muslim that is an apostate (i.e., rejects Islam) 95% 307 
takfiri a Muslim that accuses another Muslim of apostasy 86% 123 
sharia roughly: religious law 88% 305 
dawla roughly: state 66% 840 
umma roughly: the community of all Muslims across states 90% 737 
khilafah, ةفلاخلاا the caliphate 83% 543 
coconut kafir (i.e., brown outside but white inside) 86% 177 
dogs, pigs US or European Christians, Shia Muslims, Jews, atheists, … 75% 229 
kill - 67% 2560 
 
 
Figure 9. Sample keywords in jihadist rhetoric. 
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Figure 10 shows a word cloud with a sample of 200 significantly biased words (p ≤ 0.01) 
that occur very frequently in hate tweets (P(θ|x) > 95%): 
 
 
ARABIC ENGLISH DESCRIPTION 
بمس  in the name in the name of Allah the Merciful, مسب الله نمحرلاا میيحرلاا  
ةفلاخلاا the caliphate Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
ققامعأأ amaq (news agency) news outlet that claims responsibility for ISIS 
ةمحرر mercy - 
ءاارماس Samarra  holy city in Iraq; possibly the birthplace of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
دھھھهاجملاا the mujahid jihad fighter 
ررافكلاا the infidels persons with no religion 
يضفاارلاا al-rafidi rejectionists (esp. Shia Muslims) 
دیيحوتلاا tawhid The Oneness of God 
Figure 10. Sample keywords in jihadist rhetoric. 
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In the case of emoticons, the raised index finger ( ) has a significant bias (96%) as does the 
tears of joy ( ) and the arrow pointing down ( ) – in combination with other keywords of 
course. The arrow down is used to draw attention to new (previously suspended) profiles. 
On a general level, the rhetoric in online jihadist hate speech is religiously polarizing, with 
vitriolic references to Western unbelievers, apostates, crusaders, and so on. This is in line 
with the proposition that the jihadist narrative attempts to frame an Islam that is under attack 
by the West, and that all Muslims must unite against it.35 The global unity is implied by the 
umma, to which the dawla (state) is a means to an end.36  
On a fine-grained level, the keyword analysis exposes unlikely derogatory metaphors, such as 
coconut, which denotes a so-called moderate: brown (Muslim) on the outside, white (kafir) 
on the inside. New instances of such inside language use would be hard to uncover by hand. 
4 Automatic prediction 
Machine Learning (ML) is a field related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) that uses statistical 
approaches to “learn by example”. For example, when given 10,000 English texts and 10,000 
French texts, a machine learning algorithm will automatically discover prevalent linguistic 
patterns that can then be used to predict whether another text is written in English or in 
French (e.g., word endings such as -ized are good cues for English while diacritics such as é 
and ç are good cues for French). 
Machine learning algorithms expect their learning examples to be given as a set of vectors, 
where each vector is a set of feature → weight pairs37. For text classification, the features 
could be words, and the weights could be word count. We use character trigrams as features. 
Character trigrams are sequences of three successive characters, for example kuffar = { kuf, 
uff, ffa, far }. The advantage of this approach is that it efficiently models word endings, 
function words, emoticons, as well as spelling variations (e.g., the vectors for kuffar and kufr 
have a match on kuf). To prevent overfitting, we anonymized URLs and usernames (e.g., 
@StaatsNieuws becomes @user) and removed hashtag symbols (#). 
                                                
35 Mark Sedgwick, “Jihadist ideology, Western counter-ideology, and the ABC model,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 5, no. 3 (2012). 
36 Tamim Al-Barghouti, The Umma and the Dawla: the nation state and the Arab Middle East (London: Pluto Press, 2008). 
37 A helpful analogy is to think of vectors as points. Two features X and Y make up a 2-D space. We can calculate the distance between 
2-D points, i.e., d = √((X2-X1)2 + (Y2-Y1)2). Points closer to each other are more similar. More features make up an n-dimensional 
space, for which more sophisticated similarity functions exist besides the Euclidean distance function shown here. 
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4.1 In-domain evaluation 
We trained38 the LIBSVM machine learning algorithm39 with a balanced training set of 45,000 
HATE tweets (approx. 750,000 words) and 45,000 SAFE tweets. The predictive accuracy of the 
resulting model is 82% (F1-score). To calculate the F1-score, we applied 3-fold cross-
validation, meaning that we used a different 2/3 of the data for training and 1/3 for 
validation in three different tests and averaged the results.  
Each test will yield true positives (actual HATE 
tweets predicted as HATE), true negatives (actual 
SAFE tweets predicted as SAFE), false positives and 
false negatives. which we can then use to calculate 
recall (TP / TP + FN) and precision (TP / TP + FP). 
Recall corresponds to how many hateful tweets we 
are able to expose, while precision corresponds to 
how many we can expose without falsely accusing 
anyone. For example, a system that flags every 
tweet as hate exposes all hate speech (high recall) 
but also calls everyone a jihadist (low precision).  
Our model has a recall of 82.26% and a precision 
of 82.30%. The harmonic mean of both gives the 
F1-score. The error matrices of TP, TN, FP, FN for 
the three tests are shown on the right. The F1-
score varies across languages, e.g., it is 79% for 
English, 84% for Arabic and 80% for French 
(Figure 11). 
  
TEST 1 TP TN FP FN 
HATE 12725 11963 2887 2425 
SAFE 11963 12725 2425 2887 
 
TEST 2 TP TN FP FN 
HATE 12533 12208 2832 2427 
SAFE 12208 12533 2427 2832 
 
TEST 3 TP TN FP FN 
HATE 12490 12121 2989 2400 
SAFE 12121 12490 2400 2989 
 
Figure 11. Accuracy by language. 
While 82% accuracy is encouraging, the caveat is that our test was conducted under lab 
conditions: using an equal amount of HATE and SAFE tweets. Consequently, the chance of a 
correct random guess is 50%. In real-life, there will likely be thousands of SAFE tweets for 
every HATE tweet, making the problem much harder. 
                                                
38 A demo in Python code with 250 HATE and 250 SAFE tweets can be found at:  
https://gist.github.com/tom-de-smedt/2d76d33f2515c5a52225af2bb4bb3900 
39 Chih-Chung Chang and Lin Chih-Jen, “LIBSVM: A Library for Support Vector Machines,” ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and 
Technology 2, no. 3 (2011): 27 
 
82% 
 CTRS-007  21/31 
Below are two examples of tweets not in the HATE corpus that are automatically detected as 
jihadist hate speech, using the trained system (one was still online in November 2017). 
RT @Abu___Suleiman: CHOKE ON YOUR FOOD: Murtadeen feeding Crusaders whilst 
thousands of Somali Muslim Muwahideen are facing famine!!!!! 
Posted by @tawheedjihad_7 (ca. June 2015) 
 
RT @RidvanMemishi3: Muwahideen leaving in west and europe imediatly should 
leave, the world is going into chaos west is most propably dangerous area to live. 
Posted by @umm_hawla__ (November 3, 2016) 
4.2 Cross-domain evaluation 
In Machine Learning, “domain adaptation” refers to the problem where a machine learning 
system appears to perform well on its own training and testing data (in-domain) but poorly 
on other related data (out-of-domain). We tested the performance of our trained system on 
the Kaggle ISIS dataset,40 which has approximately 17,000 pro-ISIS tweets by 100+ authors. 
Only a handful of these authors (3) appear in our own corpus, making this a good scalability 
test. Our system correctly flags 76% of the Kaggle dataset as HATE. About 10% of the data 
consists of fairly neutral reporting (e.g., news updates by  @RamiAlLolah), which the system 
correctly flags as SAFE, bringing the overall accuracy on the Kaggle dataset to 86%.  
OUT-OF-DOMAIN LONG TEXTS 
We then tested the performance on 50 jihadist manifestos from JustPaste.it, each containing 
about 2,500–4,000 words, written in Arabic, French and English (e.g., Impediments of Takfir 
by Al-Qaeda leader Asim Umar). These were mixed with a random sample of 450 Wikipedia 
articles (1:10 ratio) written in the same languages. The accuracy is 86% (40/50 of manifestos 
flagged as HATE, 390/450 of Wikipedia articles flagged as SAFE). In another out-of-domain 
test on long text, 93% of Lewis Carroll’s novel Alice in Wonderland is flagged as SAFE. 
OUT-OF-DOMAIN SHORT TEXTS 
We also tested the performance on 5,000 messages collected from different jihadist Telegram 
channels, written in Arabic, English, French and Dutch (e.g., Al-Fustaat Dutch). In this case, 
the accuracy is 80%. The performance of our system is relatively stable across domains. 
                                                
40 Fifth Tribe, “How ISIS Uses Twitter,” Kaggle, May 17, 2016,  
https://www.kaggle.com/fifthtribe/how-isis-uses-twitter 
86% 
80% 
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Finally, a related text analysis study41 reports a preliminary 98% in-domain accuracy for a 
system trained on 5,000 English HATE and 3,000 SAFE tweets. This result is remarkable, but 
may have been prone to overfitting since the dataset is relatively small and spans only two 
months, i.e., the system might be memorizing the most frequent hashtags used during that 
time period instead of generalizing from linguistic patterns. 
4.3 Industry applications 
In the rapidly advancing field of Machine Learning, deep learning algorithms are nowadays 
favored, as they often yield higher accuracy, especially in combination with word embedding 
techniques. Unfortunately, Deep Neural Networks are also notoriously difficult to interpret. 
We have opted to use the more traditional Support Vector Machine (LIBSVM) to allow easy 
interpretation and reverse engineering of the results. Furthermore, our approach is able to 
process hundreds of texts in under a second and it can be trained in less than 10 minutes 
using off-the-shelf electronics, contrary to the processing power required by deep neural nets. 
This is advantageous in terms of deployment, since we can retrain with new data in real-time 
to stay ahead of the evolving rhetoric. We can think of 3 useful applications: 
1. Prevention. The system is able to process large quantities of texts in real-time. It can be 
plugged into the pipeline of social networks such as Twitter to help stop the proliferation 
of online hate speech. Moderators would see a dashboard of recently flagged tweets up 
for inspection instead of having to manually sift through thousands of new tweets. 
2. Security. The system is small (<100MB) as well as portable (e.g., PyInstaller) and could 
operate off a USB stick or on a Raspberry Pi. Law enforcement agencies could use it as a 
sorting algorithm to scan the hard drives of confiscated devices, to get an estimate of 
which text documents need inspection first.  
3. Analysis. The system can be retrained quickly. It can be used as a discovery tool by 
scholars and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) personnel to monitor the evolution of 
jihadist hate speech rhetoric. While according to some media outlets ISIS has been 
defeated, the struggle between the resilient jihadist vision of a stateless unity of Muslims 
against the perverted and out-of-control Western culture is not over.42 
                                                
41 Michael Ashcroft, Ali Fisher, Lisa Kaati, Enghin Omer, and Nico Prucha, “Detecting Jihadist Messages on Twitter,” in 2015 European 
Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, 161-164, 2015. 
42 Anthony N. Celso, “Zarqawi’s Legacy: Al Qaeda’s ISIS ‘Renegade’,” Mediterranean Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2015): 21-41. 
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4.4 Case study: Inside News 
During February 2018, we monitored the Inside News Global News Agency profile on Twitter 
( @InsideNewsAg), which became active on January 29, 2018, steadily posting over 700 tweets 
to over 90,000 followers (Figure 12). On the surface, this profile posed as a neutral reporting 
agency, while our system flagged 70% of its tweets as suspicious.  
 
Figure 12. Inside News Agency employing countermeasures against identification. 
Most tweets are not blatant hate speech, but contain more subtle hints of jihadist affiliation, 
such as sporadic references to “the apostates”, once sharing a link to the al-Naba newsletter,43 
or distributing inside information with a biased, pro-ISIS undertone: 
Pro rebel channels spread the fake news that #IS soldiers threatened they will “rape” 
rebels women, to justify their continuous failue in #Yarmouk. 
Posted by @InsideNewsAg (February 17, 2018) 
Most tweets are written in Arabic, others in near-perfect English. We discovered a number of 
idiosyncrasies in the author’s English writing style, such as using foto instead of photo (7x), 
camion instead of truck (1x), and consistently quoting all proper names, leading us to believe 
that the author(s) might be of French or Moroccan origin. The profile was suspended from 
Twitter on February 28, 2018, but not before we identified 8,000 of the 90,000 followers.  
                                                
43 “New issue of The Islamic State’s newsletter: ‘al-Nabā’ #120,” Jihadology, 
http://jihadology.net/2018/02/22/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-newsletter-al-naba-120 
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5 Network analysis 
It has been noted that in-group radicalization within social networks (e.g., Twitter) has been 
key to radicalization to violence.44,45 During data collection, we also collected the usernames 
of each of the followers (i.e., friends) of a Twitter profile and we monitored which profiles 
retweet (i.e., cite) what other profiles. This results in a set of 13,097 X knows Y relations and 
21,373 X cites Y relations. Figure 13 shows a representation46 of the @Dabiq_Magazine 
network, displaying users that cite @Dabiq_Magazine and users that in turn cite those users. 
The representation exposes a handful of clusters and an “information highway” in the center, 
but in general it is not very helpful because of its dense structure. 
 
Figure 13. Twitter users that cite Dabiq Magazine and users that cite those users (ca. 2015). 
                                                
44 Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Belgian Radical Networks and the Road to the Brussels Attacks,” CTC Sentinel 9 (2016): 6. 
45 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
46 Tom De Smedt. Modeling Creativity: Case Studies in Python (University Press Antwerp, 2013). 
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Graph Theory is a branch of mathematics that studies networks. It has produced efficient 
algorithms to identify the shortest paths between two points (i.e., nodes) in a network, to 
identify communities (i.e., clusters of nodes) and to identify important nodes. One technique 
called eigenvector centrality (cf. Google PageRank47) identifies the most important nodes by 
counting how many times they are referred to, taking into account how many times the 
referring nodes are in turn referred to. Such nodes are called influencers and correspond to 
users that control the flow of information.48 
Using the Pattern toolkit, we applied eigenvector centrality > 25% as a filter to the Dabiq 
network to produce Figure 14. This representation is insightful: displaying the network of 
influencers that controlled the flow of information about Dabiq magazine around 2015.   
 
Figure 14. “Influencers” that cite Dabiq Magazine (ca. 2015). 
                                                
47 Lawrence Page, Sergey Brin, Rajeev Motwani, and Terry Winograd, “The PageRank Citation Ranking: Bringing Order to the Web” 
(Stanford University, 1999). 
48 Christine Kiss and Martin Bichler, “Identification of influencers – Measuring influence in customer networks,” Decision Support 
Systems 46, no. 1 (2008): 233-253. 
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In this representation, important nodes are bigger, and important information highways are 
broader. Node labels with eigenvector centrality > 50% have a black background. Several of 
the displayed profiles (e.g., @anjemchoudary) have indeed been prosecuted in 2016, 
suggesting that the technique has predictive merit. But manual review is always necessary, 
since the network may include false positives such as news agencies and experts (e.g., 
@vicenews and @p_vanostaeyen) that report their findings and in turn get cited by jihadists, 
as was the case with @p_vanostaeyen.49 Finally, we wish to point out that a number of studies 
have also used more specialized methods to analyze terrorist networks, beyond our scope.50  
6 Discussion 
AI systems can be useful to assist with the detection of online jihadist hate speech. In our 
work, we have used automated statistical techniques with a stable predictive accuracy of 
80%. The idea is not new: more than a decade ago, law experts already discussed the need 
for regulations and technology against online hate speech.51 In more recent years, computer 
scientists have also discussed linguistic methods for the detection of hate speech, noting the 
absence of robust solutions.52 More solutions are emerging, but online jihadist hate speech is 
a relatively new phenomenon, with as of yet no clear regulations or technological solutions. 
With this paper, we hope to contribute to the progressive insight. On request we will freely 
share our data with known intelligence agencies and research institutes. 
7 Future work 
We have attempted to automatically detect jihadist rhetoric by examining combinations of 
words, emoticons and spelling variations. However, present-day online communication 
involves not just text, but a combination of text, images, video, audio, and so on. Essentially, 
all communication is multimodal.53 In future work, we want to examine how the automatic 
detection can be improved by combining text analysis with image recognition approaches on 
the set of 10,000 images we have collected. 
                                                
49 Bruno Struys, “Jihadsite versleuteld in strijd tegen terreur,” De Morgen, January 12, 2017. 
50 Matthew C. Benigni, Kenneth Joseph, and Kathleen M. Carley, “Online extremism and the communities that sustain it: Detecting the 
ISIS supporting community on Twitter,” PLOS One 12, no. 12 (2017). 
51 Alexander Tsesis, “Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet,” San Diego Law Review 38 (2001): 817. 
52 William Warner and Julia Hirschberg, “Detecting Hate Speech on the World Wide Web,” on Proceedings of the Second Workshop on 
Language in Social Media, 19-26, 2012. 
53 Gunther Kress, Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication (London: Routledge, 2009). 
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